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IDENTITIES CUBED:
PERSPECTIVES ON MULTIDIMENSIONAL
MASCULINITIES THEORY
Ann C. McGinley* & Frank Rudy Cooper**1
I. INTRODUCTION: CONCEPTS OF LAW, MASCULINITIES,
AND MULTIDIMENSIONALITY
We spent much of the last three years conceiving of and producing our
edited collection, Masculinities and the Law: A Multidimensional Approach.2
Creating the book entailed surveying the most important masculinities work
touching on law by scholars in both law and the social sciences. We then
switched gears and solicited legal scholars of gender, race, and other aspects of
identities to write original essays on masculinities. The topics range from
norms about who can be a firefighter to the way norms of masculinity influence
the behavior of policemen and soldiers; from employment discrimination
against masculine cocktail waitresses to that against transgendered employees;
from the contradictions of legal treatment of fathers in the U.S. to the ways
unauthorized migrant fathers use the dangers of border crossing to boost their
masculine esteem; from how Title IX fails to curtail the masculinity of sport to
the racist assumptions behind the prison rape debate; from the complicated
nature of women’s veiling in Turkey to the surprising roots of homophobia in
Jamaican dancehall music.3 In drawing these insights, the authors also stage
important conversations between varied schools of thought. The book draws on
feminist theory, but also on critical race theory in its forms of AsianCrit, criti-
cal race feminist, and LatCrit theories, as well as on the related approaches of
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, UNLV Boyd School of Law. J.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1982. I would like to thank the entire Nevada Law Journal staff with
particular thanks to Lindsey Gassmann, Aaron Haar, and Alan Miller for their hard work and
close edits. Thanks also to former Dean and current Provost John Valery White, Acting Dean
Nancy Rapoport, Jeanne Price, Jeff Stempel, and David McClure of UNLV Law School and
Rick Buckingham of Suffolk University Law School for their support and work on this
project.
** Professor, Suffolk University Law School. I thank all of the above as well as Edwin
Batista, Raeha Blouin, Theo Cooper, Kalila Courban, Diane D’Angelo, MyungJin Lee, and
Armando Ortiz.
1 Large portions of this article were first published in the introduction to MASCULINITIES
AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley
eds., 2012) [hereinafter MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW] . We thank NYU Press, and particu-
larly Debbie Gershenowitz, for permitting us to reprint much of our introduction to the book.
2 MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 1.
3 See id. at vii–viii.
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ClassCrit and queer theories.4 Both topically and methodologically, therefore,
the book is appropriately termed “multidimensional.”
What we are trying to accomplish with the book is to introduce a new
perspective on identities, law, and culture—Multidimensional Masculinities
Theory (“MMT”).5 Following in the wake of critical legal theory, MMT
presumes that identities, law, and culture are fundamentally about the distribu-
tion of power.6 Law is a particularly potent mechanism for distributing
resources because it relies upon assumptions about human behavior that
reproduce preexisting social relations. In other words, law and culture are co-
constitutive:7 cultural norms influence law and legal norms simultaneously
influence culture. Identities, law, and culture are co-constituted in that each
influences the others.8
The principal site of analysis for MMT is masculinities. That means we
are paying attention to norms—be they hegemonic in general or only in partic-
ular contexts—regarding what it means to be manly.9 These norms play out in
how individuals see themselves, how they are seen by others, and how they
perform their identities in order to influence how they are seen. Norms about
masculinities also influence how law is conceived of and enacted in practices.
4 See id. at 2.
5 Of course, forerunners exist. See, e.g., BLACK MEN ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY 10
(Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999); Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal
Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 782–83 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for
“Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1358, 1364 (2000); Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal The-
ory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship;
or, Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1414–15 (1998).
6 See Kimberle´ Crenshaw et al., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRIT-
INGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberle´ Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (introducing
book by tracing its roots in Critical Legal Studies concepts such as the critique of law as
surreptitiously exercising power) [hereinafter Crenshaw et al., CRITICAL RACE THEORY] .
7 See Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1418 (2000).
8 See Frank Rudy Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect” from Racial Profiling to Depolicing:
Toward a Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH: A CONSTITUTIVE
APPROACH 139, 140 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect” from Racial Profiling to Depolicing].
9 Masculinities theory has already established itself in the social sciences, see R. W. CON-
NELL, MASCULINITIES xi (2d ed. 2005), and posits that “assumptions about the meaning of
manhood influence behaviors, ideologies, and institutions.” Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First
Unisex President?: Black Masculinity and Obama’s Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV.
633, 635 (2009) [hereinafter Cooper, Our First Unisex President?]. Masculinities scholars
analyze “how societal norms shape behavior of individual men and women, how masculini-
ties are imbedded in the structure of institutions, and how individuals and groups perform
masculinities within those institutions.” Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculini-
ties, Sexual Minorities, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 720
(2010). The allocation of power based on concepts of masculinity often occurs in an invisi-
ble way because masculinity is considered a natural trait deriving from the male biology
rather than learned behavior. Masculinities scholars challenge the assumption that masculini-
ties are biological and conclude that masculinities are performances constructed by social
norms. Note as well that the term “masculinities” is plural. That is because men (and, some-
times women) perform different types of masculinities ranging from the hegemonic to alter-
native types of masculinities. See Michael Kimmel, Integrating Men into the Curriculum, 4
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 181, 189 (1997).
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Finally, those norms inform cultural assumptions that influence identity forma-
tion and law. We thus see masculinities at work in behaviors, institutional
structures, and discourses about how the world does or ought to work
(ideologies).10
The point of MMT is to look at matters in a multidimensional way. That
means considering masculinities to be multifaceted and in perpetual motion.
The concept of multidimensionality is invoked by the cover of the book. Drawn
in pencil, the Rubik’s Cube has a somewhat provisional look. With its different
colored squares mixed up, it suggests a clash among different elements. That
dynamism is heightened because the cube is tilted, suggesting that the whole
unit, not just its parts, is in motion.
This Rubik’s Cube metaphor demonstrates the two basic principles of
multidimensionality theory. First, identities are co-constituted. If the red
10 See generally MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 1.
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squares are thought to represent the individual’s race, we must always bear in
mind that the individual also has gender, class, and sex orientation identities,
among others. When we move a red square to the front of the cube (if any side
can be said to be the front), we also move the green, brown, orange, and other
colored cubes into new positions. Metaphorically and in real life, race is linked
to gender, class, sex orientation, and other identities. The impression that a red
square makes on you is affected by what other squares are around it. Likewise,
race does not have one meaning, but its very meaning is influenced by the other
identities that are in play. Think about it this way: Doesn’t it matter whether
you are black and male or black and female? The precise combination of one’s
identities is what both gives the individual her sense of self-identity and influ-
ences exactly how others see that individual.
Moreover, though, the Rubik’s Cube metaphor also demonstrates mul-
tidimensionality theory’s second basic principle, that context is crucial to the
formation and interpretation of identities. The Rubik’s Cube may be turned to
present just one side or a few sides to the viewer. It may be mostly red, brown,
and orange when it is presented that way. Think of the perspective the viewer
of the cube is presented with as akin to an individual changing how she
presents herself in different contexts. When interacting in an art gallery, an
individual may choose to present her creative side; when in a business meeting,
she will present her more formal side. Like the Rubik’s Cube, when an individ-
ual moves into different contexts, she will reveal different facets of herself. In
this sense, the individual elements of the Rubik’s Cube and of our identities are
both intertwined and context-dependent.
Our book seeks to expand critical legal theory by considering a set of
cultural and legal norms—masculinities—that have been under-explored, and
to do so in a multidimensional way. It is our premise that masculinities studies
offer insights that, especially when using a multidimensional lens, will aid in
improved legal interpretation. This essay explains the origins and premises of
masculinities theory, the underlying concepts of multidimensionality, and how
the two sets of theories can work together to analyze and criticize legal deci-
sion-making. Our ultimate goal is to urge lawmakers and judges to adopt new
perspectives on issues of human behavior in order to improve law and legal
interpretation.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERLYING THEORIES
Multidimensional masculinities theory is both substantive and method-
ological. As substance, it encourages the law to take into account the power of
cultural norms by considering how a person’s overlapping identities affect how
he or she is perceived and how he or she will react in different contexts. MMT
is a perspective that investigates how concepts of masculinity interact with
other categories of identity in varied legal contexts. Multidimensionality theory
holds that categories of identity are (1) always intertwined with one another and
(2) experienced and interpreted differently in different contexts.11 We apply
11 See Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The
False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2010).
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multidimensionality theory to masculinities research because it helps to show
that masculinities differ depending on the context and the other categories of
identity with which they overlap. We bring masculinities research to mul-
tidimensionality theory because too few scholars have focused multidimension-
ality theory on the often-invisible category of masculinity.
As methodology, MMT encourages us to shift the lens so that we can view
legal doctrine through different prisms that illuminate human behavior and how
the law should relate to it. A short way of explaining the methodology is pro-
vided by Nancy Dowd, Nancy Levit, and Ann McGinley in Feminist Legal
Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, a chapter in our book. They say that we
should constantly shift lenses to take different perspectives on issues.12 For
example, a study of boys in prisons requires us to shift the primary lens of
analysis from gender to race in order to understand the ways racism constructs
boys of color as inherently dangerous.13 The shifting of lenses we advocate is
another metaphor for the shifting perspectives on identities that the cover of the
book suggests.
Multidimensional masculinities theory has a number of theoretical founda-
tions. It derives from feminist theory, feminist legal theory, and critical race
theory (especially critical race feminism, as influenced by queer theory), which
together spawned multidimensionality theory. We encourage the expansion of
masculinities research by viewing concepts of masculinity through a mul-
tidimensional lens in order to examine legal issues in new ways. To explain our
proposed approach, we begin with a short explanation of how MMT has
emerged and where we hope the new discipline of MMT will go.
A. Feminist Theory and Feminist Legal Theory
Masculinities theory is an outgrowth of the feminist theorizing that devel-
oped during the feminist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s.14 These
feminists posited that patriarchal systems allowed men as a group to exercise
power over women as a group.15 Soon thereafter, feminist legal theory devel-
oped. Feminist legal theory “as an approach . . . describes and analyzes the
law’s impact on women, particularly focusing on how law subordinates
women.”16 As the numbers of women in the legal academy grew, they began to
challenge the male-oriented foundations of the law using the new tool of femi-
nist legal theory.17
Similarly, the number of law professors of color increased significantly in
the late 1980s, and some of these professors began to write about race in new
12 See Nancy E. Dowd, Nancy Levit & Ann C. McGinley, Feminist Legal Theory Meets
Masculinities Theory, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 25, 46 [hereinafter
Dowd, Levit & McGinley, Feminist Legal Theory].
13 See id. at 31; see also Part III.B. infra.
14 `ANGELS CARAB´I, CONSTRUCTING NEW MASCULINITIES: THE REPRESENTATION OF MASCU-
LINITY IN U.S. LITERATURE AND CINEMA (1980–2003) 4 (Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos
Sociales, Instituto de la Mujer 2003) (Spain).
15 Id. at 10.
16 Twila L. Perry, Family Law, Feminist Legal Theory, and the Problem of Racial Hierar-
chy, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY 243, 244 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011).
17 Id. at 243–44.
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ways, challenging the neutrality of the law.18 These scholars focused on the
invisible racial biases contained in the law. By the late 1980s, their work had
coalesced into the critical race theory movement. At the heart of the movement
were racial minority feminist women. For instance, Kimberle´ Crenshaw and
Angela Harris, two black female law professors, wrote influential articles criti-
cizing white feminist legal theorists for their failure to recognize that women of
color experience law and culture differently than white women do.19 Those
articles helped initiate critical race feminism, which permanently altered all
feminist legal theory.
The late 1980s also saw postmodernism begin to take hold in feminist
thought, especially in the social sciences, emphasizing that there is no one truth
and questioning the power of law to find one solution to a common problem
among women.20 Recently, feminist legal theorists like Martha Fineman do not
focus on gender. Rather, they address what they perceive to be all people’s
common vulnerability.21 Nonetheless, it is fair to say that feminist theory origi-
nally focused on women and that many, if not most, feminist legal theorists
continue to do so.
As feminist legal theory took hold in the legal academy, masculinities the-
ory was emerging in the social sciences in response to the women’s movement
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Masculinities theorists would agree with
feminists that men as a group have power over women as a group, but they tend
to complicate the situation. Peter F. Murphy explains that by the late 1970s, for
the first time, men began to examine the effects of the social construction of the
roles of men. In essence, men started using feminist methodology to “turn the
feminist lens upon themselves as men.”22 He states, “feminism became more a
critical perspective through which men could scrutinize masculinity, and less a
call for men to act solely as advocates for women’s causes.”23
Both feminist theory and masculinities theory see much of gender as
socially constructed, but the former has tended to analyze all men as fundamen-
tally and equally oppressors of women.24 Thus, while feminist theory does the
important work of analyzing the power that men have as a group over women
as a group, it does not always consider power differentials among men and how
power differentials harm not only women (as a group and as individuals) but
also many men. In contrast, masculinities theorists see masculinity as a social
construct that encourages men to compete with one another in order to prove
their masculinity to each other. Those behaviors, in turn, harm women because
as men anxiously compete to prove their masculinity to one another, they often
18 Id. at 243.
19 Id. at 244–45.
20 See Esther Vicente, Feminist Legal Theories: My Own View from a Window in the Carib-
bean, 66 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 211, 225–26 (1997).
21 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1 (2008).
22 Peter F. Murphy, Introduction to FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 1, 9 (Peter F. Murphy
ed., 2004).
23 Id.
24 See NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE
13–14 (2010).
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use women as pawns or props in the competition.25 Moreover, segregation of
the sexes and differentiation from women and all things “feminine” enhances
the masculinity of men, leading to the false impression that women are inferior,
and places pressure on all men to conform to a particular hegemonic type of
masculinity.26
Feminist legal theorists who engage with masculinities theory not only
analyze the ways masculinities harm men but also ask how we might break
down gender segregation and social gender barriers to the benefit of both men
and women. In Masculinities and the The Law: A Multidimensional Approach,
for example, the chapter by Dowd, Levit, and McGinley uses masculinities
theory not only to understand the male subject better, but also to return to the
question of how societal constructions of men’s roles create difficulties for
women who seek equality.27 The lens-shifting that Dowd, Levit, and McGinley
advocate is necessary to merge masculinities theory with feminist and critical
race theories, and in some instances queer theory, to achieve an understanding
of why masculinity in general is such an enduring social value and how mascu-
linities combine with race, sexual orientation, class, and other identities in dif-
ferent contexts. Furthermore, it is important to use multiple lenses to show both
how identity concepts are embedded in the law and how the law furthers gen-
der, race, class, and other hierarchies.
In pursuing this project, we note that although masculinities theory begins
with feminism, it sometimes becomes so absorbed with its analysis of the harm
that socially constructed masculinity does to men that it appears to forget that,
as a group, men have power over women as a group. Some masculinities theo-
rists have responded to this weakness by moving from the concept of “hege-
monic masculinity,”28 the view that there is a form of masculinity that is most
powerful, to the concept of the “hegemony of men,” the view that men as a
group have significant power even though individual men do not always expe-
rience that power because of their race, class, or other characteristics.29 We do
not see the concepts of hegemonic masculinity and the hegemony of men as
mutually exclusive. We endorse an approach that uses the idea of hegemonic
(norm-setting) masculinity to explain why women and some men are disadvan-
taged in a given cultural context but also remains vigilant about remembering
the overall dominance of men over women. We use the term “hegemonic mas-
25 See MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, Gendering Desire, in THE GENDER OF DESIRE: ESSAYS ON
MALE SEXUALITY 3, 15 (2005).
26 See David S. Cohen, Sex Segregation, Masculinities, and Gender-Variant Individuals, in
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 167, 175.
27 See Dowd, Levit & McGinley, Feminist Legal Theory, supra note 12, at 30.
28 See R. W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the
Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 829, 832 (2005).
29 See Christine Beasley, Rethinking Hegemonic Masculinity in a Globalizing World, 11
MEN & MASCULINITIES 86, 88–89 (2008); Jeff Hearn, From Hegemonic Masculinity to the
Hegemony of Men, 5 FEMINIST THEORY 49, 59 (2004). At Multidimensional Masculinities
and Law: A Colloquium, the University of Nevada-Las Vegas Boyd School of Law confer-
ence on Feb. 18–19, 2011, celebrating the completion of the chapters in this book, Russell
Robinson pointed out that the term “hegemony of men” risks erasing female masculini-
ties. See Devon W. Carbado & Russell K. Robinson, Panel Discussion at Multidimensional
Masculinities and Law: A Colloquium, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Feb. 18, 2011), available at
http://law.unlv.edu/pdf/Colloquium_program_2-2011.pdf.
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culinity” more broadly here to mean any form of masculinity that has power
over others in a particular place at a particular time. Thus, although many
regard the upper-middle-class white male’s form of masculinity to be hege-
monic, that type of masculinity is most powerful in many settings, but not in
all. Other forms of masculinities that are often characterized as merely reactive
to the hegemonic masculinity may actually become hegemonic (in the sense of
being norm-setting) in certain local settings.30 For example, while the white
upper-middle-class type of masculinity may reign in board rooms and may
have more power socially because of its access to capital, hypermasculinities
may be hegemonic when they govern in blue-collar workplaces or inner cit-
ies.31 And even those two types of hypermasculinity, both hegemonic in their
own local economies, will manifest themselves differently depending on the
other identities in play and the context of the situation.
B. Critical Race Theory
Multidimensional masculinities theory argues that we will best understand
the significance of the multiplicity of identities and the difference context
makes by linking feminist theory with a multi-lensed version of critical race
theory. Critical race theory is fundamentally about investigating the paradox
that race “is simultaneously socially constructed and materially crucial.”32
Although the meanings of race derive not from nature but nurture,33 “driving
while black” can get you killed.34 Second, there are hierarchies among and
within categories of identity.35 Third, the material consequences of the hier-
archization of identities include the skewed distribution of goods ranging from
money to social capital.36 Fourth, the skewing of the distribution of goods,
previously accomplished by de jure and de facto regimes of intentional discrim-
ination, is now most often accomplished by means of implicit bias.37 Fifth,
identities are intersectional. This means that people’s identities intersect; we are
simultaneously raced, gendered, sex-oriented, classed, and so on.38
30 See Demetrakis Z. Demetriou, Connell’s Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critique,
30 THEORY & SOC’Y 337, 345–46 (2001).
31 See Frank Rudy Cooper, The King Stay the King: Multidimensional Masculinities and
Capitalism in The Wire, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 96, 102; Ann C.
McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of Sex,” 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1166–67 (2008).
32 See Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect” from Racial Profiling to Depolicing, supra note 8, at
148.
33 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1295–96 (2005).
34 See, e.g., DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK 129 (2002).
35 See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimila-
tion, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 867 (2006).
36 See Cooper, Our First Unisex President?, supra note 9, at 643.
37 Implicit bias is a term referring to the unconscious favoring of particular groups. See
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1493–94 (2005).
38 See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991); Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 587 (1990). For
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A multidimensional approach to masculinities works within and also seeks
to extend the intersectionality school of critical race theory. In a nutshell, inter-
sectionality is the concept that unique identities are formed at the places where
categories of identity intersect.39 For example, critical race feminism is pre-
mised on the notion that black women have identities that are not reducible to
the sum of the lowest common denominator of racial identity plus the lowest
common denominator of female identity.40 Black women’s senses of self and
the traits externally attributed to them are distinct from those associated with
black men and white women. Intersectionality theory is thus antiessentialist in
its rejection of the tendency to identify the needs or goals of black women in
light of what is deemed generally important to groups with which they
overlap.41
Multidimensionality theory stems from intersectionality theory and was
developed by critical race theorists who were also concerned with queer the-
ory.42 Multidimensionality theory can be broken down into at least five insights
that are well-identified by Athena Mutua in her chapter in Masculinities and the
Law: A Multidimensional Approach.43 As a general matter, these boil down to
two principles: (1) identities are co-constituted and (2) identities are context-
dependent. A multidimensional approach argues that since identities are co-
constituted, race, gender, class, sexual orientation, and other discrete identities
are actually intertwined within one another and cannot be understood in isola-
tion. For example, assumptions about the gender characteristics (e.g., overly
masculine) and sexual proclivities (e.g., excessive) of blacks are themselves
part of the meanings of blackness.44 A multidimensional approach also argues
that the meanings of discrete identities, even when understood in light of their
co-constituted nature, interact differently in different settings. For example, the
self-identities and attributed identities of black men are generally different in
the South of the United States from those in the North.45 Moreover, the same
individual may find different aspects of his identity to be more or less salient
over time, in different settings, and depending on what other identities are in
analysis of other tenets of critical race theory, see especially four important volumes on the
subject: Crenshaw et al., CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 6, at 357–58; CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CROSS-
ROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds.,
2002); and JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA 27 (2d ed. 2007).
39 See Crenshaw, supra note 38, at 1243–44.
40 See CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 7 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003).
41 See Harris, supra note 38, at 588–89.
42 See Hutchinson, supra note 5, at 1360–61; Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the
Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1276 (1997); Valdes, supra note 5, at
1456–57.
43 Athena D. Mutua, The Multidimensional Turn: Revisiting Progressive Black Masculini-
ties, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 78, 84–85.
44 Rhonda M. Williams, Living at the Crossroads: Explorations in Race, Nationality, Sexu-
ality, and Gender, in THE HOUSE THAT RACE BUILT 136, 140 (Wahneema Lubiano ed.,
1997).
45 RICH ´E RICHARDSON, BLACK MASCULINITY AND THE U.S. SOUTH: FROM UNCLE TOM TO
GANGSTA 196 (2007).
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the mix. Consequently, an individual with the same combination of identities
might be treated very differently depending on the cultural context.46
With that focus on context in mind, it will be helpful to describe how these
multidimensionality insights relate to intersectionality theory. At a conference
celebrating the completion of the chapters of our book, Devon Carbado empha-
sized that multidimensionality is not “post-intersectionality” but implicit within
a proper reading of some of the original works.47 We agree but use the term
multidimensionality because we think its use tends to focus people on the influ-
ence of cultural context. At the same conference, Juliet Williams pointed out
that there are political reasons for making people aware of the intersectional
roots of multidimensionality, not least of which is to avoid displacement of the
critical race feminist roots of intersectionality.48 We agree that multidimension-
ality theory makes the most sense when it is explained in light of its roots in
intersectionality theory. We switch terms simply to focus the mind on the
broader context in which overlapping identities interact. The metaphor of inter-
sectionality suggests two cars traveling down roads that collide at an intersec-
tion.49 The metaphor of multidimensionality more readily suggests a world that
exists at many levels, with trains underground, planes above, and other automo-
biles on the roads. At the level of metaphor, while intersectionality theory
might be understood as two-dimensional, multidimensionality theory clearly
encompasses three dimensions. It is not that one cannot read the original inter-
sectionality articles to imply multiple dimensions, but we think one is more
likely to consider multiple identities and contexts when thinking about the mul-
tidimensionality of identities. As we discuss in the next part, legal interpreta-
tion needs masculinities theory, and a masculinities theory of law needs
multidimensional theory.
III. THEMES OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL MASCULINITIES
A multidimensional approach to masculinities theory that uses the shifting
lenses approach allows us to capture human experience more accurately and
richly. Because much legal interpretation is based on concepts of how and why
people behave in certain ways in particular contexts, a more multidimensional
understanding of this behavior should affect how law is interpreted. We there-
fore pose two questions that we briefly answer: (1) Why does law need mascu-
linities theory? (2) Why does a masculinities theory of law need
multidimensionality theory?
46 See Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 277–79 (2002).
47 Devon W. Carbado, Panel Discussion at Multidimensional Masculinities and Law: A
Colloquium, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://law.unlv.edu/pdf/Collo
quium_program_2-2011.pdf.
48 Juliet Williams, Panel Discussion I at Multidimensional Masculinities and Law: A Collo-
quium, in Las Vegas, Nev.: The Theory and Practice of Multiple Masculinities (Feb. 18,
2011), available at http://law.unlv.edu/pdf/Colloquium_program_2-2011.pdf.
49 See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149 (1989).
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A. Why Does Law Need Masculinities Theory?
Much of law is based on untested implicit and explicit assumptions about
human behavior. Many of those assumptions include dated views of motiva-
tions for behavior that judges and the law ascribe to actors in particular con-
texts. For instance, law often assumes a rational actor who only acts based on
explicit intentions. We can use masculinities theory to push the law to interpret
behavior differently in certain situations.
Law is a discipline that relies on other disciplines to give it content (or at
least it should do so more often than it does). While laws and regulations can be
found in law books or on the Internet, the laws themselves do not answer most
of the important questions regarding interpretation and application. Most law,
be it statutory or common law, relies on interpretation so that it can be applied
to the circumstances before the decision maker—judge, jury, legal counsel, or
citizen—who is governed by the law. This interpretation is largely based on the
decision maker’s experience, especially his or her understanding of how “rea-
sonable” people act in given circumstances. But often a decision maker is inca-
pable of intuiting whether a person’s behavior is reasonable because the
decision maker, perhaps unconsciously, employs stereotypes and cognitive
biases as a screen through which she or he processes information.50 The
Implicit Association Test, which grades the subject’s automatic preference for
black or white faces, for old or young, for the disabled or the able-bodied, for
women or men in careers, demonstrates that even though people believe that
they do not hold preferences for one group or another, they respond differently
to prompts identified with one group or the other.51 If people are still perva-
sively implicitly biased, and research confirms that we are, law’s supposedly
objective search for the perspective of “the reasonable man” or even “the rea-
sonable person” is doomed.52 The problem is not only that stereotyping pre-
vents most people from acting reasonably, but also that stereotyping prevents
us from attaining objectivity in our interpretations of behavior.
A powerful example of how stereotypical beliefs may affect law is the
idea embodied in the saying, “boys will be boys.” What does this aphorism say
about masculinity? First, it assumes that all boys are the same, at least in the
essence of what makes them male. Thus, their behavior is biologically related
and not a product of social construction. Second, it assumes that it is natural for
boys to act aggressively and wildly.53 This saying is used ordinarily to excuse
behavior that is somewhat antisocial or wild, even illegal. It protects boys who
have engaged in behavior such as drunkenness, destruction of property, or
assaultive offenses against girls or less masculine boys. It presumes that this
behavior is a result of male hormones, and that the boys will outgrow it. It
ordinarily applies to boys who, when acting in groups, engage in this destruc-
50 See Kang, supra note 37, at 1490–94.
51 See, e.g., Implicit Social Cognition: Investigating the Gap Between Intentions and
Actions, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html (last visited Feb. 2,
2013).
52 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 4 (2003).
53 See David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist
Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135, 138 (2009).
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tive behavior. Because this behavior results from biology, the saying seems to
assume, we should forgive boys for their behavior. They cannot help it. Nor can
we help it through any intervention.
Masculinities theorists have a different view of such behavior. We do not
agree that much of boys’ behavior is controlled by biology. Society encourages
and pressures boys to compete with one another to prove their masculinity.
These pressures create relentless competition among boys, and they engage in a
homosocial (intra-gender) battle to prove themselves.54 Thus, a boy proves his
masculinity by engaging in reckless, destructive behavior that often constructs
women or girls as objects to be used to prove the boys’ masculinity to other
boys.
An example of this type of behavior and community response is illustrated
in Our Guys,55 the true story of a group of high school football players in a
middle-class New Jersey town who raped a mentally impaired teenage girl. The
boys involved had for a number of years engaged in destructive, disrespectful,
and at times criminal behavior, all of which was excused or ignored by their
families and the community. When the rape occurred, the town closed ranks
around the boys and blamed the victim, the press, and the justice system, but
few believed that the boys themselves or their families were responsible for the
behavior. This reaction was harmful to the young woman and her family, to
other girls in the town, to the community as a whole, to the other boys who did
not engage in such behavior, and even to the very boys who raped the girl.
Even despite the criminal prosecutions, the rapists learned from their parents
and the community that their behavior was acceptable.56
This “boys will be boys” attitude is apparent in hostile work environment
law under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act57 as well. A victim must prove
by an objective standard that the harassing behavior was severe or pervasive,
that it was unwelcome, and that it occurred “because of . . . sex.”58 This stan-
dard, which the courts interpret as being difficult to meet,59 doubts the veracity
of the victim, assumes that the encounter was welcome, and then concludes that
without severity or pervasiveness the behavior is not actionable. Moreover,
when a man is the victim, especially when a group of men are engaged in the
harassment, he often loses his lawsuit because the courts consider the behavior
to be either mere “hazing” or insufficiently severe or pervasive.60 Masculinities
theorists understand that these behaviors occur as homosocial testing grounds.
Members of the group harass the victim to prove their masculinity to one
another and to prove the masculinity of the group. They select their male victim
because of his failure to conform to masculinity norms and because dominating
54 See KIMMEL, Masculinity as Homophobia, supra note 25, at 25, 29; EVE KOSOFSKY
SEDGWICK, BETWEEN MEN: ENGLISH LITERATURE AND MALE HOMOSOCIAL DESIRE 3 (1985).
55 BERNARD LEFKOWITZ, OUR GUYS: THE GLEN RIDGE RAPE AND THE SECRET LIFE OF THE
PERFECT SUBURB (Vintage Books 1998) (1997).
56 Id. at 3–4.
57 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e(17) (2006).
58 Id. § 2000e(2)(a)(1).
59 See Ann C. McGinley, Because of Sex (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author); see also
McGinley, supra note 31, at 1230–31.
60 See McGinley, supra note 31, at 1227–28.
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him demonstrates to the group that he is not one of them. This harassment
thereby preserves the masculinity of the group and its members.
In light of the “boys will be boys” attitude, consider an example of how
masculinity plays out in the criminal law. When killers seek to mitigate their
culpability from the crime of murder down to that of manslaughter, which sig-
nificantly reduces the sentence, courts look for evidence that they acted in the
“heat of passion” and with “sudden, adequate provocation.”61 The crucial ques-
tion of whether what provoked the killer was adequate is answered by asking
how the “reasonable person” would act in the circumstances.62 It turns out that
many of the cases taught to law students in order to demonstrate the standard
involve men killing women who have bruised their masculine esteem either by
denigrating their sexual prowess or becoming involved with other partners.63 It
seems that defending one’s masculinity against women is reasonable enough to
cut years off a man’s sentence. Here, then, is an example of law mirroring, if
not reinforcing or even creating, a culture in which we assume “boys will be
boys.”
But the boys in Our Guys and men using the provocation defense do not
enjoy the privilege of their gender only. It also seems clear that they enjoy
privilege along lines of race, sexual orientation, class, and geography. How
should we analyze the difference those privileges make?
B. Why Does a Masculinities Theory of Law Need Multidimensionality
Theory?
A multidimensional masculinities analysis begins by noting that the “boys
will be boys” slogan does not protect all boys. A large percentage of boys
engage in lawbreaking behavior, but a much smaller percentage of them is
prosecuted for it.64 While many believe that the law responds neutrally to crim-
inal behavior by boys, social forces excuse some boys while punishing others
for similar behavior. “Boys will be boys” shields only boys who are members
of privileged classes—primarily white, “straight,” upper-middle-class, Chris-
tian boys. Black boys, especially those in lower socioeconomic classes, do not
enjoy the protection of the mantra. Rather, black boys are criminalized at
younger and younger ages, often arrested and tried as adults for their violations.
Black masculinity, an alternative (and assertedly subversive) form of masculin-
ity, is dangerous and frightening to the white community, and the law presumes
that it must be contained.65
Here we see that identities are co-constituted because masculinity does not
mean just one thing even when we consider only the context of the juvenile
justice system. Young black masculinity means “punish” while young white
masculinity means “rehabilitate.”66 Simultaneously, the differential meanings
61 See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 321–51
(2d ed. 2009); see also LEE, supra note 52, at 3–4.
62 LEE & HARRIS, supra note 61, at 321–51.
63 See Harris, supra note 5, at 790 n.47.
64 See DOWD, supra note 24, at 87–88.
65 See id. at 88.
66 See Rashmi Goel, Delinquent or Distracted? Attention Deficit Disorder and the Con-
struction of the Juvenile Offender, 27 LAW & INEQ. 1, 1–2 (2009).
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of young black and white masculinities demonstrate the contextual nature of
the “boys will be boys” narrative. Because concepts such as “boys will be
boys” are embedded into law, there is unequal prosecution and treatment of
boys depending on their social class and race. Moreover, boys who are accused
of crimes may be treated differently from girls who engage in similar
behavior.67
The topic of crime provides another example in the disturbing phenome-
non of hyper-incarceration. Note that we do not refer to the explosion in incar-
ceration over the past forty years as “mass incarceration.” Instead, we use the
term “hyper-incarceration” to capture the targeted nature of punishment in the
United States. Mass incarceration would be either truly a general phenomenon
or deservedly focused on certain populations requiring social control. The
Nixon era’s reframing of the government as the enemy, which was greatly
accelerated by the Reagan Revolution, is the real reason that we have seen the
explosive growth of the prison industry.68 The current anti-government dis-
course suggests that helping the poor is insensible and warehousing the poor in
prison is reasonable.69
Sociologist Loı¨c Wacquant reveals that this hyper-incarceration is a mul-
tidimensional attack on a specific group of people.70 He argues that hyper-
incarceration has “been finely targeted by class, ethnicity, and place.”71 That is,
the poor are the targets. But not just any poor people—blacks and/or Latinas/
os. Furthermore, it is important to note that hyper-incarceration consists mostly
of inner-city residents. Moreover, there is a gender element, as it is the men
who are most targeted for incarceration while poor racial-minority women in
the inner city are “inculcat[ed with] the duty of working for work’s sake.”72 A
masculinities approach to law might note this last phenomenon but needs mul-
tidimensionality theory to explain how all of the pieces of this puzzle fit
together.
IV. CONCLUSION
Multidimensional masculinities theory attempts to unify three different
areas of inquiry—masculinities theory, multidimensionality theory, and law—
to arrive at a deeper understanding of how gender, race, national origin, relig-
ion, sexual orientation, class, and other identity factors are present yet often
invisible in legal theory and doctrine. Multidimensional masculinities theory of
law argues that we must always simultaneously consider gender, race, class,
and other identities, but we must also shift lenses to focus primarily on a partic-
ular identity that is foregrounded in that cultural context. Multidimensional
masculinities theory thus explores how particular concepts of masculinity are
67 See Cohen, supra note 53, at 137–40.
68 See Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyper-Incarceration as a Multidimensional Attack: Replying to
Angela Harris Through The Wire, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 67, 71 (2011).
69 See id.
70 GLENN C. LOURY WITH PAMELA S. KARLAN, TOMMIE SHELBY & LO¨IC WACQUANT, RACE,
INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 57, 59 (2008).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 68–69.
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used to produce power in ways that differ depending on what other categories
of identity they interact with, and in what cultural context. Using that approach
reveals how individual men and groups of men achieve and retain power, that
there are differentials among men, and how these differentials harm both
women and many men. Because much legal analysis is based on narrow con-
ceptions of how and why people act in certain ways in particular situations,
MMT can change how law is interpreted and applied. We believe that these
changes will result in a more just society.
